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I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(the Act), U.S. courts entered a new era of determinate and
predictable sentencing.' In an effort to eliminate disparities in
sentencing, the Act created the Federal Sentencing Commission
(the Commission), which in turn designed the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the Guidelines), a set of mandatory sentences for each
defendant based on his crime and the manner in which he
committed it.2 The Guidelines forced judges to put their personal
assessments aside and apply justice through a formulaic system
based on levels and categories. 3 Twenty-two years later, as the
federal courts reconceive the role of the Guidelines, the
assessment of scholars, practitioners, and judges is mixed.4 While
they reigned, the Guidelines definitely decreased sentencing
disparities, but numerous flaws revealed how a lack of
individualization could lead to grave injustices. 5 Yet even at their
inception, the Guidelines contained sections that invited
subjective assessment.
One example is the Sentencing Commission's treatment of
trust. The inclusion of trust as a guideline factor complicates a
system that aims for uniformity and predictability. A judge
cannot easily measure the damage from a betrayal in dollars and
1. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be
Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679 (1996); Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
2. See generally Breyer, supra note 1.
3. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2004)
[hereinafter "GUIDELINES"].
4. Paul H. Robinson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years
Later: An Introduction and Comments, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1231-32 (1997)
(outlining contributions to a symposium presenting papers reflecting on the
Guidelines); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines'
Modified Real Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342, 1343-44 n.2, 3 (listing
scholarly commentary critical of the Guidelines in note 2 and commission
members commentary in support of the Guidelines in note 3).
5. See, e.g., Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247 (1997); Laurie P. Cohen &
Gary Fields, Reasonable Doubts: How Unproven Allegations Can Lengthen
Time in Prison, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at Al.
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cents as the Guidelines often require,6 nor can she easily discern
whether a particular defendant is deserving of an increased
punishment because the victim or society placed trust in him.7
Yet in a variety of places, the Guidelines attempt to capture the
additional moral condemnation inherent in a crime committed
through a breach of trust.
There are two ways that the Guidelines deal with crimes
involving abuse of trust. In conjunction with the criminal code,
the Guidelines often provide higher sentences for acts that involve
breaches of public or private trust. These include many forms of
corruption 8 and crimes defined by the perpetrator's position or
occupation. 9 But if an offense fits into a sentencing category that
is not sufficiently particularized to reach a breach of trust, the
Guidelines also provide a catchall enhancement in § 3B1.3: if the
defendant "abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a
manner that significantly facilitated the commission or
concealment of the offense," the Guidelines instruct the judge to
add two levels to the offense level. 10
6. See, e.g., GUIDELINES §§ 2B1.1, 2B2.1 (guidelines for "Larceny,
Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft" and "Burglary of a Residence or a
Structure Other than a Residence," respectively).
7. See GUIDELINES § 3B1.3 (requiring an enhancement for abuse of a
position of trust).
8. See, e.g., GUIDELINES § 2C1.1 (guideline for "Offering, Giving,
Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Right;
Fraud Involving the Deprivation of the Intangible Right to Honest Services of
Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Governmental
Functions"); id. § 2C1.2 (guideline for "Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or
Receiving a Gratuity"); id. § 2P1.1(b)(4) (enhancement if the defendant was a
law enforcement or correctional officer who assisted or instigated an escape
from a correctional facility).
9. See, e.g., GUIDELINES § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) (enhancement if the defendant
served as an operation officer on any craft or vessel carrying a controlled
substance); id. § 2E5.1(b)(1) (enhancement if the defendant is a fiduciary of
the benefit plan or labor organization affected by his acceptance, offer, or
solicitation of a bribe); id. § 2G1.3(b)(1) (enhancement for various sexual
crimes with a minor if the defendant was a "parent, relative, or legal
guardian of the minor" or "the minor was otherwise in the custody, care, or
supervisory control of the defendant"); § id. 2T1.4(b)(1)(B) (enhancement for
tax fraud if the defendant was "in the business of preparing or assisting in
the preparation of tax returns").
10. The section also covers the use of a special skill to commit a crime. In
its entirety, the current version of the guideline reads:
§3B1.3. Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill
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Arguably, these assessments could mean less in the post-
Booker world of non-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. 11 With
the Guidelines only "recommended," it may be less crucial to
understand why someone is sentenced for honest services fraud
instead of bribery with a two-level enhancement for abuse of a
position of trust. But, given the recent holdings in the wake of
Booker, and the possible legislative "fixes" in reaction to the
decision, the Guidelines remain salient.12 Under Booker, if judges
must formulate a Guideline sentence, and then decide whether to
apply that sentence, subjective evaluations can serve multiple
purposes. They can set the Guideline sentence at a preferable
level, providing the judge with an opportunity to follow the
Guidelines. Or such evaluations can make the Guidelines better
match a sentence based on facts found by the jury or conceded by
the defendant. In this manner, Booker has troubling implications
for subjective portions of the Guidelines. Since the decision allows
sentences exceeding the maximum authorized for the crime if
facts supporting the sentence are "admitted by the defendant,"
courts may have to grapple with whether the facts a defendant
admitted support a decision that he or she held a position of
trust. 13
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used
a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the
commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels. This
adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of trust or skill is
included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic. If
this adjustment is based upon an abuse of a position of trust, it may
be employed in addition to an adjustment under §3B1.1
(Aggravating Role); if this adjustment is based solely on the use of a
special skill, it may not be employed in addition to an adjustment
under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role).
GUIDELINES § 3B1.3 (2004).
11. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (deeming the
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional but maintaining
them in a non-mandatory form).
12. See Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decision for the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 33-34
(2005) (statement of Frank 0. Bowman, III, M. Dale Palmer Professor of
Law, Indiana University School of Law) (explaining "topless guidelines"); see
also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114-20 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining
how courts should apply Booker).
13. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 ("Any fact (other than prior conviction) which
is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized
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In order to analyze trust's role in the Guidelines it is essential
to understand the role of trust in society. Part II of this Article
will examine this role, looking at the ways in which the Guidelines
and their commentary correlate with scholarship on trust. Part
III will focus on a particular guideline, § 3B1.3, and its
enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. The judicial
application of this guideline reveals the subjective nature of trust
and the numerous ways in which acts can be interpreted as
betrayals. Applying the knowledge from Part II's trust
scholarship to these sentencing decisions, Part IV recommends a
means of applying § 3B1.3 in order to maximize the advantages of
trust and ensure enhanced punishments only for breaches that
damage beneficial relationships in society.
II. PUNISHING ABUSES OF TRUST IN THE GUIDELINES
A. The Importance of Trust in Society
When Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, it
directed that the new sentencing regulations achieve "honesty,"
"uniformity," and "proportionality."'4 Despite the inherent conflict
between the latter two goals, the Commission attempted to strike
a balance between a perfectly uniform system that punished all
defendants with the same sentence and a proportional system that
accounted for all possible characteristics before deciding on the
appropriate penalty. 15 In its "Policy Statement," the Commission
conceded that "a sentencing system tailored to fit every
conceivable wrinkle of each case can become unworkable and
seriously compromise the certainty of punishment and its
deterrent effect."'16  Yet from the Guidelines' inception,
commissioners thought trust was important enough to include it
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Bush, 134 F. App'x 904, 907 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that
defendant did not admit to holding a position of trust in her plea agreement);
United States v. Segura, 139 F. App'x 79, 82-83 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that
the defendant admitted enough facts in his plea agreement for the court to
apply a sentence enhancement for abuse of trust).
14. See GUIDELINES § 1A1.1 cmt. editorial note.
15. See id. (providing the Commission's policy statement).
16. Id.
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in sentencing. assessments. 17  As a result, along with more
common issues in the realm of criminal law - such as the amount
of money a burglar stole, 18 the vulnerabilities of a targeted
victim, 19 or the defendant's role in the offense 20 - the Guidelines
analyze whether a crime took advantage of a bond of trust
between two parties.
Recent scholarship supports this decision. Across disciplines,
academic literature points to the important role that trust plays in
society. 21 In the field of economics, studies show how trust, rather
than regulatory incentives, serves to overcome collective action
problems and encourage cooperation. 22 In the area of health care
law, professors have debated the degree to which managed care
regulations interfere with or bolster the trust between doctors and
patients, 23 while other scholars point to the importance of trust in
maintaining deference to authority24 and encouraging mutually
17. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (1988).
18. Id. § 2B2.1(b) (increases offense level based on loss in a "Burglary of a
Residence or a Structure Other than a Residence").
19. Id. § 3A1.1 (guideline for "Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable
Victim").
20. Id. § 3B1.1 (guideline for a criminal with an "Aggravating Role").
21. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 591, 596 (2001) (commenting on the sudden spike in scholarly work
on trust "from perspectives of law, economics, psychology, sociology, or
philosophy"); Joshua A. Kobrin, Note, Betraying Honest Services: Theories of
Trust and Betrayal Applied to the Mail Fraud Statute and § 1346, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 779, 795-803 (2006) (providing an overview of trust
theories and their application in legal scholarship).
22. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 333 (2001). Kahan summarizes numerous economic studies of trust that
show how individuals who are part of a group contribute to that group -
despite collective action problems - because they trust that others are
making a similar contribution rather than cheating. Kahan's primary focus
is what motivates taxpayers to contribute to the fisc; based on
aforementioned studies, he concludes that trust that others are paying taxes,
rather than criminal regulations, foster the necessary cooperation.
23. Compare Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV.
463, 470 (2002) (arguing that trust plays an essential role in health care law,
but that in the area of managed care, regulations foster "an attitude of
distrust," with M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical
Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919, 947-49 (2002) (countering Hall's
contractarian position and arguing that managed care regulations can also
serve a trust-promoting function).
24. Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Democratic Governance, in 1 TRUST &
GOVERNANCE 276-80 (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998).
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beneficial relationships.2 5 Sociologists also cite the role of trust in
our society: James Coleman's work shows the degree to which
trust is essential to our daily lives while Robert Putnam's much
heralded Bowling Alone combines statistics, empirical studies, and
anecdotes to show how trust can make communities safer,
healthier, and more prosperous.26 According to Putnam, "[w]hen
each of us can relax ... a little [due to our trust], what economists
term 'transaction costs' - the costs of the everyday business of life,
as well as the costs of commercial transactions - are reduced. '27
As a result, trusting communities have the advantage in
everything from commerce and charity to political engagement
and other forms of civic participation. 28
Putnam isolates two forms of trust that contribute to this
phenomenon. "Thick trust" - trust in those whom we know well,
based on personal experience - provides some of these benefits.
Yet, a more generalized form of trust - "thin trust" - is far more
prevalent. 29  Because thin trust "extends the radius of trust
beyond the roster of people whom we can know personally," it is
also arguably more important than thick trust.30 Many fruitful
business and employment relationships rely on thin trust. As thin
trust supports these relationships and makes them more
productive, trust and the benefits that come with it prove
"mutually reinforcing." 3 1
Unfortunately, many studies also reveal the contrapositive;
while "trust begets trust, mistrust begets mistrust," allowing
25. See Carol M. Rose, Lecture, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 531, 533 (1995) ("In real life, people seek explanations orjustifications not for trustworthiness, but for defections from it. ... [E]ven if
we don't know why, we can predict that we will find norms of cooperation
when people need them."); see also Tamar Frankel & Wendy J. Gordon,
Introduction, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321 (2001) (introducing a variety of theories
regarding the interaction of trust and law).
26. JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 91-116 (1990);
ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 134-47 (2000).
27. PUTNAM, supra note 26, at 135.
28. Id. at 134-37.
29. Id. at 136-37.
30. Id. at 136.
31. Id. at 137 (citing Wendy M. Rahn & John E. Transue, Social Trust
and Value Change: The Decline of Social Capital in American Youth, 1976-
1995, 19 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 545-65).
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singular betrayals to have far ranging negative effects.32 Unlike
trust, for which benefits can be seen and experienced, distrust is
often impossible to invalidate because, according to one scholar, it
"prevents people from engaging in the appropriate kind of social
experiment or, worse, it leads to behavior which bolsters the
validity of distrust itself. '33 Pointing to history, scholars show
how failures of trust have led to breakdowns of society, and the
rise of the mafia. 34 Putnam even suggests a correlation between
eroding societal trust and a rise in the number of lawyers in the
United States. 35 The increase is the result of law and other formal
institutions supplanting trust and providing a new basis for
cooperation. 36  Other academics come to more judgmental
conclusions, disparaging the manner in which regulations displace
trust and deny people the self-perpetuating benefits of trust
relationships. 37
Trusting parties can also engage in activities that limit the
benefits of trust to those within an inaccessible group, often to the
32. Frankel & Gordon, supra note 25, at 322; see also Anthony Pagden,
The Destruction of Trust and its Economic Consequences in the case of
Eighteenth-century Naples, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS 127 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) [hereinafter TRUST] (arguing that
"most effectively constituted agencies" can destroy trust).
33. Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST, supra note 32, at
234 ("Once distrust has set in it becomes impossible to know if it was ever in
fact justified for it has the capacity to be self-fulfilling. ... It then becomes
individually 'rational' to behave accordingly, even for those previously
prepared to act on more optimistic expectations. Only accident or a third
party may set up the right kind of 'experiment' to prove distrust
unfounded.").
34. See Pagden, supra note 32, at 127-41 (explaining how Spanish rule in
Naples destroyed trust within society and "ruined the kingdom"); Diego
Gambetta, Mafia: the Price of Distrust, in TRUST, supra note 32, at 158-75
(showing how lack of trust, and organized crime's exploitation of distrust, led
to the rise of the mafia in southern Italy).
35. PUTNAM, supra note 26, at 145-46.
36. Id.
37. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 582 (2001)
("The existence of legal coercion means that one no longer can clearly
demonstrate that he respects his promise regardless of self-interest, but
rather can show only that he can be legally coerced into performing."); Hall,
supra note 23, 512-15 (arguing that in health care, regulations send a signal
that the industry cannot be trusted); Kahan, supra note 22, at 334 (asserting
that regulatory incentives to achieve desirable behaviors "may well
undermine the conditions of trust to hold collective action problems in
check").
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detriment of society at large. In her study of global corruption,
Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman explains how trust can facilitate
corruption; the same trust that leads to productive relationships
for the public good can also foster bribery and maintain the power
of organized crime. 38 And while trust is generally good for society,
there are times when trusting parties are simply begging to be
disappointed. In this manner, misplaced trust can also have
negative effects for society, as the inevitable betrayals only serve
to decrease trust.39
This recent spate of research reveals that the Commission
may have been on to something; in general, it is inadvisable to
condone abuses of trust. Crimes that involve such abuses are
more culpable because they not only halt the self-perpetuating
nature of trust; they also encourage the growth of distrust. And
distrust can breed more distrust, leading to damaged
communities, inefficient relationships, and costly oversight.
Crimes that include a measure of betrayal also have the added
cost of threatening an otherwise beneficial system. For example, a
criminal who abuses trust to steal not only causes monetary
losses; his actions also begin a breakdown of trust between parties
that threatens the very system that initially bestowed trust upon
the criminal.
B. Trust in the Guidelines
The threat that betrayals of trust pose to society may explain
why the justice system views crimes involving betrayal as more
culpable than other crimes. 40 For example, breaches of securities
38. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 97 (1999). This "counterproductive for society"
aspect of trust is apparent in the prisoner's dilemma hypothetical. If the
prisoners trust one another, neither will confess.
39. See PUTNAM, supra note 26, at 135-36 ("[O]nly a seeker of sainthood
will be better off being honest in the face of persistent dishonesty."). A
variety of scholars allude to levels of trust rising and falling within society
and the existence of cycles of trust and distrust. See Rose, supra note 25, at
554-55 (citing an economic study of cycles of ethics in business and positing
similar results in the realm of trust); Kahan, supra note 22, at 346 (proposing
that initial levels of trust in other groups within a collective (e.g., other
taxpayers) may dictate the impact of interceding trust regulations). But cf.
Gambetta, supra note 33, at 234 ("Trust, even if always misplaced, can never
do worse than [sustained distrust].
40. See GUIDELINES app. C, amend. 666 (effective Nov. 1, 2004); United
2006]
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laws are criminal regardless of who commits the act, but a
registered broker is arguably more culpable. A recent amendment
to the Guidelines justifies increases in base offense levels for
public corruption crimes with similar logic. According to the
Commission, the change reflects the conclusion that,
in general, public corruption offenses previously did not
receive punishment commensurate with the gravity of
such offenses. . . .The higher alternative base offense
levels for public officials reflect the Commission's view
that offenders who abuse their positions of public trust
are inherently more culpable than those who seek to
corrupt them, and their offenses present a somewhat
greater threat to the integrity of governmental
processes. 41
This position appears to have influenced other sections of the
Guidelines in which a criminal act threatens an entire institution
or profession. The aforementioned broker who commits a
securities violation receives a four-level increase over another
defendant who commits the same act,42 while a custodian who
sexually abuses those in his care is subject to a two-level
increase. 43 The damage done to the immediate victims by these
crimes is equal to the damage that results when other
perpetrators commit the same acts. The only distinction is that
these perpetrators - be they prison guards trusted with the care of
inmates or brokers trusted to trade on an exchange - have
undermined our trust in the systems in which they served.
While § 3B1.3 does not contain this analysis, the guideline
reflects a similar concern. The original section stated that "[i]f a
defendant abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a
States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1996). But cf. Paul G. Chevigny,
From Betrayal to Violence: Dante's Inferno and the Social Construction of
Crime, 26 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 787, 788 (2001) (arguing that criminal law has
been slow to acknowledge the impact of betrayal).
41. GUIDELINES app. C. amend. 666 (effective Nov. 1, 2004).
42. Id. §2B1.l(b)(15)(A)(ii).
43. Id. §2A3.1(b)(3) (guideline for "Criminal Sexual Abuse; Attempt to
Commit Criminal Sexual Abuse"); see also id. § 2A3.2(b)(1) (guideline for
"Criminal Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen Years
(Statutory Rape) or Attempt to Commit Such Acts," raising a sentence by four
levels if the minor was in the "custody, care or supervisory control of the
defendant").
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manner that significantly facilitated the commission or
concealment of the offense, increase by two levels.' '44 Therefore,
enhancement required that the defendant (1) occupied a position
of trust and (2) abused that trust in a manner that significantly
contributed to his ability to commit the crime. The adjustment
could not be used in conjunction with an, "aggravating role
enhancement" or for a crime in which abuse of trust was already
"included in the base offense level or specific offense
characteristic."4 5 The short background commentary repeated the
guideline's instruction and explained that § 3B1.3 increased the
sentence of some defendants because "[s]uch persons generally are
viewed as more culpable."4 6 The only relevant application note
(the other dealt with a separate "special skill" clause of the
guideline) served to remind judges that "the position of trust must
have contributed in some substantial way to facilitating the crime
and not merely have provided an opportunity that could as easily
have been afforded another person. '47 The example that followed,
however, confused more than it clarified. "The adjustment," the
commentary explained, "would not apply to an embezzlement by
an ordinary bank teller. '48
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION
3B1.3
Judges have generally agreed with both the Commission and
various scholars regarding the importance of trust. When
interpreting § 3B1.3, several judges have cited the adage that a
44. The original guideline, in its entirety, read:
§3B1.3. Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used
a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the
commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels. This
adjustment may not be employed in addition to that provided in
3B1.1, nor may it be employed if an abuse of trust or skill is included
in the base offense or specific offense characteristic.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (1988).
45. Id.
46. Id. cmt. background.
47. Id. cmt. n.1.
48. Id. For an analysis of § 3B1.3 focusing on the impact of the term
"position" and the bank teller exception, see Lisa M. Fairfax, Trust, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and Lessons from Fiduciary Law, 51 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1025, 1039-45 (2002).
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person whose crime takes advantage of another's trust does more
harm than the "ordinary pick-pocket. '4 9 In contrast to common
criminals, these offenders "may well do serious damage to the ties
that bind us together in this complex society," making their acts
all the more reprehensible.5 0
Yet courts have still struggled with the lack of clarity and
subjective nature of identifying a position of trust. In the years
that followed the institution of the Guidelines, courts espoused
three theories to define the meaning of "a position of trust": (1) the
position allowed the defendant to commit a "difficult-to-detect
crime"; (2) the position provided the defendant with the necessary
"access and authority" to commit the crime; and (3) the position
provided "managerial discretion" that empowered the defendant to
commit the crime. Other issues, however - such as the
Guidelines' bank teller exception and the special role of public
servants - would continue to frustrate and confuse the application
of these theories.
A. The "Difficult-to-Detect" Standard
The "difficult-to-detect" theory, which initially provided an
example of how an offender's position of trust could substantially
contribute to the commission of a crime, soon supplied an easy
metric for deciding which defendants warranted a § 3B1.3
enhancement. 51
In one early case, the Ninth Circuit held that a police officer
who flashed her badge at Drug Enforcement Agents requesting
identification, and subsequently revealed that she was smuggling
drugs, properly received an abuse of trust enhancement. 52
49. See United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1996)
("Where an individual makes himself particularly vulnerable by entrusting
another with substantial authority and discretion to act on his behalf and
then relies upon and defers to that person, a decision to take advantage of
that trust and vulnerability is particularly abhorrent, as it undermines faith
in one's fellow man in a way that the ordinary pick-pocket simply cannot.");
see also United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting
extensively from Ragland); United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d 1083, 1087
(9th Cir. 1998) (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
50. Isaacson, 155 F.3d at 1087.
51. See United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing
United States v. Ehrlich, 902 F.2d 327, 331 (5th Cir. 1990)).
52. United States v. Foreman, 926 F.2d 792, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Defining 'facilitate"' as 'to make easier or less difficult,"' the
court explained that the defendant identified herself as a police
officer in order to "make it significantly easier to conceal
possession of a controlled substance."5 3  Because "[tihe public,
including fellow law enforcement agents, expect that police
officers will not violate the laws they are charged with enforcing,"
when the defendant used her badge, she "took advantage of that
trust to make it easier for her to conceal criminal activity. '54 The
dissent, however, pointed out that the Guidelines only applied to
"offenders who abuse positions of public trust; not merely to those
who occupy such positions or even to those who use such
positions. '55 It was not only questionable whether the defendant
showed her badge in an effort to deflect suspicion, the dissent
argued, it was also highly doubtful that her use of the badge in
any way 'significantly facilitated the. . . concealment of the
offense.' ' 5 6  But the majority's holding foreshadowed the
importance of the "difficult-to-detect" standard, through its
decision that the effort to conceal trumped the minimal
contribution to the crime that such an effort provided. 5 7
The Ninth Circuit soon clarified this distinction, asserting
that "the primary trait that distinguishes a person in a position of
trust from one who is not is the extent to which the position
provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong. '58
Positions that allowed for such a "wrong" could be identified by
two characteristics: "the inability of the trustor objectively and
expediently to determine the trustee's honesty" and "the ease with
which the trustee's activities can be observed. '59 This analysis
found support in § 3B1.3's commentary, which mentioned the role
that a position of trust could play in the concealment of a crime.60
53. Id. at 796 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
812 (1976)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 797 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 798 (emphasis in original).
57. See id. at 796.
58. United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990).
59. Id. (explaining that a "criminal act which cannot be discovered as a
matter of routine is such a 'difficult-to-detect' wrong" and the ease with which
a defendant can be observed implicates his "ability to make an undetected
post-crime flight").
60. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1
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In subsequent cases involving employee/employer
relationships, courts struggled with the "difficult-to-detect"
standard. In United States v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit found that a
moving truck driver, who sold and traded items that he was
supposed to transport, should receive a § 3B1.3 enhancement. 6 1
Because the families who owned the property Hill stole had
already relocated overseas, they could not expediently determine
Hill's honesty, while Hill's role as a "long-distance" truck driver
provided few opportunities for observation. 62 This "unwatched
and exclusive control over the families' belongings for an extended
period of time" made Hill's position one of trust.63 In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit decided that a cashier's embezzlement scheme did
not abuse a position of trust, because the defendant's superiors
could have detected her crime had they not been 'inept,"'
"'sloppy,"' and "'derelict in their duty."' 64 Poor management did
not define the defendant's culpability; to decide otherwise would
allow "lax supervision" to "convert one's job into a 'position of
trust."'65
B. The Difficulties of the Bank Teller Exception
As many courts pointed out, the bank teller exception in the
commentary appeared to conflict with the language of the
guideline itself.66  On what basis could a bank teller's
embezzlement not be an abuse of a position of trust? The Ninth
Circuit answered this question with ease, indicating that "bank
teller" was simply not a position of trust.67 Maintaining the
(1988).
61. 915 F.2d at 504.
62. Id. at 506-07.
63. Id. at 507.
64. United States v. Helton, 953 F.2d 867, 870 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting
the district court's findings).
65. Id.; see also United States v. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 1994)
(remanding to the district court to decide whether the defendant's freedom of
action to commit the crime came from her bank/employer or her co-
conspirator/supervisor). But see United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d 1083
(9th Cir. 1999) (deciding that despite the defendant's supervisors' failure to
proceed through the bank's security requirements, and their termination for
failing to properly oversee defendant, the defendant held a position of trust).
66. See United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Odoms, 801 F. Supp. 59, 63 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
67. This is not the most apparent interpretation of the commentary.
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"difficult-to-detect" standard, the court held that checking the
teller's till balance provided a "simple, objective method of
determining whether a teller has embezzled any funds which pass
through the teller's hands," while easy surveillance prevented
concealment. 68 The Fifth Circuit followed this analysis; while
crimes abusing the freedoms of other positions in a bank might
warrant an enhancement, an ordinary bank teller did not occupy
such a position.69
But another bright-line option also existed. In many cases,
defendants argued that courts should draw the line at the crime,
making "embezzlement" rather than the "bank teller" the
commentary's important distinction. 70  According to these
analyses, embezzlement already included an abuse of trust as part
of its base offense level, making § 3B1.3 inapplicable. Numerous
courts acknowledged the apparent legitimacy of this argument: by
definition, embezzlement does require a finding of a breach of
trust.71 Yet, looking to the Guidelines, these courts pointed out
that abuse of trust under § 3B1.3 had a specific meaning related
to a position of trust that must have been abused rather than
merely breached.72 Furthermore, the commentary's focus on a
Since the actual commentary reads, "[t]his adjustment, for example, would
not apply to an embezzlement scheme by an ordinary bank teller" it does not
universally state that a bank teller (and by comparison, other similar
positions) is not a position of trust. It merely says that embezzlement in such
a position would not constitute an abuse of a position of trust that
"significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense...."
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1 (1988).
68. Hill, 915 F.2d at 505.
69. United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300, 1305 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. McMillen, 917 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Ehrlich, 902 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1990)).
70. See infra notes 72-74.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Chimal, 976 F.2d 608, 613 (10th Cir. 1992)
(admitting that embezzlement by definition involves abuse of trust); United
States v. Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219, 1225 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States
v. Sayklay, 542 F.2d 942, 944 (5th Cir. 1976) for the notion that "[t]he essence
of embezzlement lies in breach of a fiduciary relationship deriving from
entrustment of money").
72. See Georgiadis, 933 F.2d at 1225 ("While embezzlers like Georgiadis
may indeed breach a duty of trust by fraudulently appropriating the property
of another ... an abuse of trust under the Guidelines requires something
more.") (citations omitted); see also United States v. Levy, 992 F.2d 1081,
1084 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting defendant's argument that § 3B1.3 did not
apply because abuse of trust is an essential element of embezzlement,
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bank teller's embezzlement seemed too specific to exclude all forms
of embezzlement from § 3B1.3 coverage. 73 As a result, despite the
easy solution, courts generally ruled that abuse of a position of
trust was not an element of embezzlement and was not included
in its base offense level.
Yet courts still struggled to harmonize the bank teller
exception with the enhancement's application in other scenarios.
In United States v. Lange, the Eighth Circuit distinguished mail
theft by a mail handler from "embezzlement by an ordinary bank
teller," by arguing that Lange's access to express and certified
mail gave him an opportunity that "[p]ostal employees in general
did not have."74 As a result, Lange had access to mail that was
"especially sensitive and probably more likely to contain things of
value than mail in general," making the enhancement
appropriate.75
Dissenting in Hill, Judge Heaney pointed out that the bank
teller exception served to distinguish "between a position of trust
which substantially facilitates a crime and one that merely
provides an opportunity for crime."7 6 He argued that like a bank
teller, whose job provides access to money but whose position does
explaining that the base offense level for embezzlement crimes, "covering
many forms of theft, does not take into account an abuse of trust"); Chimal,
976 F.2d at 613 ("Although embezzlement by definition involves an abuse of
trust, embezzlement by someone in a significant position of trust warrants
the enhancement when the position of trust substantially facilitated the
commission or concealment of the crime."); United States v. Christiansen, 958
F.2d 285, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that although embezzlement
includes an element of breach of trust, § 3B1.3 requires more culpable
conduct than an ordinary breach); United States v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016,
1027 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the argument that a statute punishing the
misapplication of bank funds - which could only be committed by individuals
in certain positions - includes abuse of a position of trust in the base offense
level). But cf., United States v. Jimenez, 897 F.2d 286, 287 (7th Cir. 1990)
(commenting in dicta that enhancement for abuse of trust would not be
applicable to embezzlement).
73. United States v. Drabeck, No. 89-30237, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
22367, at *7 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1991) ("If the Commissioners meant for the
enhancement not to be applied to all embezzlers because abuse of trust is
already included in the crime of embezzlement, they would have no cause to
single out 'ordinary bank tellers' in the Application Note."); see also
Georgiadis, 933 F.2d at 1225.
74. 918 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1990).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 712.
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not facilitate its theft, Lange's work "provided him with occasional
access to uncertain quantities of cash and valuables," but with
"limited ... opportunities for undetected theft."7 7
With some approval for Judge Heaney's dissent, Judge
Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois issued an opinion "in
the hope - perhaps forlorn" that prosecutors in the district who
continued to argue for trust enhancements for mail theft would be
"educable on the subject."7 8  "It is the unanimous view of all
participants in the Sentencing Council in this District that the
United States Attorney's position urging such an across-the-board
increase distorts the meaning of the 'abuse of trust' concept," the
court explained. 79 Even assuming that the work of the postal
system "is instinct with the 'public trust,"' Judge Shadur found
that the Sentencing Commission's decision to apply one mail theft
guideline to theft by postal employees and another to theft by all
other persons made it "impossible to conclude that the Sentencing
Commission equated all Postal Service employment with the
'public trust' within the meaning of Guideline § 3B1.3."80
This analysis also corresponded to the district court's
interpretation of the bank teller exception. Challenging the Ninth
Circuit's "difficult-to-detect" theory and its explanation of the
exception, Judge Shadur held that the Guidelines excluded bank
tellers because "the job is at a quite low level and is not a highly-
skilled occupation, even though by its very nature it provides the
employee with extraordinary opportunities for criminal activity."8 1
C. The Access and Authority Standard and the Rejection of the
Bank Teller Exception
Judge Shadur's halfhearted rejection of the "difficult-to-
detect" standard drew a distinction for low level occupations. 82 In
77. Id.
78. United States v. Arrington, 765 F. Supp. 945, 946 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
The Arrington decision distinguished itself from Lange but admitted "[t]here
is in this Court's opinion a good deal of force to the dissent by Senior Circuit
Judge Heaney." Id. at 949 (citing Lange, 981 F.2d at 712).
79. Id. at 946. The court described the Sentencing Council as "[a]bout a
dozen of the active judges" who gathered weekly to discuss sentencing
recommendations and other related issues. Id. at 946 n.1.
80. Id. at 946, 948.
81. Id. at 949.
82. Id. The district court explained that the Ninth Circuit's "difficult-to-
20061
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doing so, the judge questioned the prevailing jurisprudence by
creating a new explanation and application of the bank teller
exception.8 3 A focus on the access and authority provided to the
defendant further challenged the basis of the "difficult-to-detect"
theory, offering an even broader conception of a position of trust.
Just a year after Judge Shadur's opinion, in a case involving a
postal worker, the Ninth Circuit cited the "difficult-to-detect"
theory but then pointed out that millions of citizens and the postal
service place "faith in those it hires to carry and deliver the
mail. '8 4 Evidence of this faith could be found in the fact that the
"Service does not routinely spy or check up on its carriers ... does
not register every piece of ordinary mail to ensure that it reaches
its intended destination. 8 5 As a result of this lack of surveillance
- not the aforementioned indicia of positions that support the
commission of a "difficult-to-detect" wrong - the court held that
mail carriers serve in a "quintessential position of trust. '86 The
Second Circuit paid similar lip service to Hill in United States v.
Castagnet, but appeared to make its decision based on some other
standard.87  In the case, a former airline employee entered
ticketing areas during slow hours and used the airline's computer
code to issue tickets to himself.88 His past employment, and the
knowledge of the codes that came with it, provided an opportunity
to commit the crime. 89 But it was the timing of the crime, rather
than an unsupervised job he no longer held, that made it
"difficult-to-detect."90
This shift in focus from "difficult detection" to "opportunity
accorded" soon received a label in United States v. Odoms,91
another influential decision from the Northern District of Illinois.
Subscribing to "A New Standard," Judge Zagel wrote in Odoms
that positions of trust "confer the access or authority (not
detect" standard "does not add too much to the analysis" before turning to the
bank teller exception. Id.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 1992).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See 936 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1991).
88. Id. at 58.
89. See id. at 63 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 61-62.
91. 801 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
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necessarily the right) to handle the valuable things or to direct the
disposition of such things."92 In addition, he argued that this
''access or authority increases the defendant's ability to commit or
conceal the charged offense."' 93  While the "difficult-to-detect"
standard and related indicia "remain helpful measures
because they stem from an accommodation of the bank teller
exclusion in the commentary, they exclude some defendants who
fit within the guideline. '94  In contrast to previous courts,
however, Judge Zagel did not try to accommodate the bank teller
exception. The commentary's exclusion, he wrote, "obscures
rather than enlightens" the application of the guideline; due to its
conflict with the plain meaning of the enhancement, Judge Zagel
simply decided that it "should be disregarded."9 5
This new access and authority test allowed for a broader
interpretation of "position Of trust." For example, the Seventh
Circuit, applying the access and authority standard in a private
sector case, found that a church pastor who made false
representations in selling certificates of deposit on the church's
behalf occupied a position of trust.96 Despite telling recipients
that the church would use the certificates to finance church
improvements, the pastor spent much of the funds on extravagant
personal expenses. 97 The court held that "as a general matter, a
position of trust is characterized by 'access or authority over
valuable things.'' 98  Because church members and personnel
allowed the pastor to control church finances, their trust put him
in a position to mislead investors into believing that the church
needed funds. 99
92. Id. at 63.
93. Id. The Northern District cited numerous past cases for the premise
that "[t]he guideline already has been applied in a manner which fits this
test." Id. (citing, e.g., Castagnet, 936 F.2d 57; Ehrlich, 902 F. 2d 327; United
States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1990)).
94. Odoms, 801 F. Supp. at 64.
95. Id. at 63 (citing several circuit court decisions for the premise that
when the commentary conflicts with the Guidelines, the Guidelines take
precedent).
96. United States v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1994).
97. Id. at 1224-25.
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D. The Public Servant Rule
In yet another postal service case, a panel of the Seventh
Circuit reiterated its commitment to the access and authority
standard and endorsed Judge Zagel's rejection of the bank teller
exception. 100 But, even after finding the defendant's access to
mail put him in a position of trust, the Seventh Circuit went one
step further, objecting to the postman's violation of "his duty as a
sworn public servant to carry out the tasks entrusted to him while
performing a governmental function for a public purpose." 101
Based on this analysis, as well as the government's "general
interest in projecting a positive public image and a specific
interest in assuring efficient use of public resources," 10 2 the court
concluded "that a government employee who takes an oath to
uphold the law (as does a mail carrier) and who performs a
government function for a public purpose such as delivery of the
U.S. mail, is in a position of trust."10 3  It appeared that mere
"authority" over a public purpose, coupled with an oath of office,
created such a position.
E. The 1993 Amendment
In 1993, in an effort to reformulate "the definition of an abuse
of position of trust to better distinguish cases warranting the
enhancement," the Commission introduced an amendment that
substantially changed the commentary.104 Yet it did not eliminate
100. United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (asserting
that "a position of trust is characterized by 'access or authority over valuable
things' and that "[riather than providing guidance to the courts, the bank
teller example has produced an undesirable amount of confusion. The result
has been that courts have jumped over hurdles to contort their analysis of the
Guideline in order that they might ultimately place defendants inside or
outside the rubric of the bank teller exception") (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 421.
102. Id. (quoting Edward S. Adams, Random Drug Testing of Government
Employees: A Constitutional Procedure, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1352 (1987)).
103. Id.
104. GUIDELINES app. C, amend. 492 (effective Nov. 1, 1993). In 1990 the
Commission first requested comment regarding the abuse of trust provision.
See Notice of Proposed Amendments and Additions to Sentencing Guidelines,
Policy Statements and Commentary, 55 Fed. Reg. 5718, 5739 (Feb. 16, 1990).
Several amendments followed. See GUIDELINES app. C, amend. 346 (effective
Nov. 1, 1990) (allowing the use of the abuse of trust enhancement in
conjunction with the aggravating role enhancement); GUIDELINES app. C,
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the bank teller exception or explicitly endorse any of the
aforementioned theories. Instead, it offered a new explanation
that borrowed language from existing standards and added
language that would foster the creation of a new method of
analysis. 105
Asserting that the guideline referred to positions
"characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e.,
substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given
considerable deference)," the new note appeared to follow the
access and authority standard by asserting that "[p]ersons holding
such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less
supervision than employees whose responsibilities are primarily
non-discretionary in nature."'10 6 Yet the focus on discretion and
supervision could also be read to endorse the "difficult-to-detect"
amend. 580 (effective Nov. 1, 1998) (expanding the definition of position of
trust to include those who indicate that they assume a position that they do
not and as such gain the trust of their victim in a manner that allows for the
crime).
105. GUIDELINES app. C, amend. 492 (Nov. 1, 1993). The amendment
changed the first commentary note to read:
"Public or private trust" refers to a position of public or private trust
characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e.,
substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given
considerable deference). Persons holding such positions ordinarily
are subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose
responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature. For this
enhancement to apply, the position of trust must have contributed in
some significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment
of the offense (e.g., by making the detection of the offense or the
defendant's responsibility for the offense more difficult). This
adjustment, for example, would apply in the case of an
embezzlement of a client's funds by an attorney serving as a
guardian, a bank executive's fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal
sexual abuse of a patient by a physician under the guise of an
examination. This adjustment would not apply in the case of an
embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk
because such positions are not characterized by the above-described
factors.
Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, because of the special
nature of the United States mail an adjustment for an abuse of a
position of trust will apply to any employee of the U.S. Postal Service
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standard, while the "professional or managerial discretion"
language appeared to support the Northern District of Illinois's
seldom followed "low level position" distinction. 10 7 The new note's
examples also focused on higher-level positions, explaining that
the adjustment would apply to "an embezzlement of a client's
funds by an attorney serving as a guardian, a bank executive's
fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal sexual abuse of a patient
by a physician under the guise of an examination."108 As if these
new explanations drew clear lines, the Commission re-asserted its
belief that the "adjustment would not apply in the case of an
embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk
because such positions are not characterized by the above-
described factors."' 09
This new language did, however, serve the superfluous
purpose of confirming issues not in dispute. The Commission's
inclusion of an embezzlement scheme among its new examples
codified the courts' refusals to grant that embezzlement sentences
already included abuse of trust in the base offense level."I0 Also,
by keeping the bank teller exception, the Commission seemed to
confirm its commitment to the notion that the exception meant
something and should not be disregarded. But it refused to add
any more information on how to interpret the exception's meaning
besides adding the "hotel clerk" language. On the whole, the new
commentary provided little clarity in deciphering which standard
best met Congress's definition without deviating from this ill-
defined exception.
Still, by eliminating a large point of dispute from the debate,
the Commission may have hoped to make such arguments moot.
Creating a per se rule, the new note included an additional
paragraph at the end of the commentary that explained "because
of the special nature of the United States mail an adjustment for
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text; see also United States
v. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[The] amendment to the
commentary ... ensures that the enhancement is imposed in a manner that is
compatible with the nature of the crime of embezzlement, a crime that, as we
have noted earlier, always involves a breach of trust but oftentimes involves
an even more egregious abuse of trust that warrants a greater punishment -
the punishment permitted by this enhancement.").
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an abuse of a position of trust will apply to any employee of the
U.S. Postal Service who engages in the theft or destruction of
undelivered United States mail."1 1'
F. The Managerial Discretion Standard
Despite the still unclear application of the guideline, the
additional language in the commentary provided the federal
courts of appeals with an even greater degree of confidence (and
statutory evidence) for their respective theories. Most notably, a
new theory emerged, supported by the amendment text explaining
that positions of trust are "characterized by professional or
managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment
that is ordinarily given considerable deference).""12 In a case
reviewed just after the enactment of the new commentary, the
D.C. Circuit pointed to this new language and held that a clerk at
the Federal Trade Commission who used work information to
engage in credit card fraud did not hold a position of trust.1 13 The
court felt that to characterize such a job as one with "professional
or managerial discretion" would make the commentary's definition
"so boundless as to be meaningless."'' 4
Other courts soon cited the same language, expressing
confidence that the new commentary clarified the previous
confusion. "It is true that in dealing with the position-of-trust
enhancement courts occasionally have emphasized the employee's
freedom to commit wrongs that defy facile detection," the First
Circuit explained. 115 "But these decisions," the court continued,
"deal with earlier versions of § 3B1.3 and, thus, antedate the
Sentencing Commission's emphasis on managerial
discretion."116 Proponents of this new standard also pointed to the
111. GUIDELINES § 3B1.3, cmt. n.l.
112. Id.
113. United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The
court also held that it could apply the new commentary, even though at the
time of the defendant's sentencing the old commentary was in effect, because
the amendment "bespeaks clarification, rather than substantive alteration."
Id. at 333.
114. Id. at 332.
115. United States v. Reccko, 151 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 1998).
116. Id.; see also United States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir.
2000) (explaining that "the level of discretion is to be the decisive factor" and
that other cases "too often emphasized, we believe erroneously, the
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commentary's examples, which distinguished between "situations
involving attorneys, bank executives, and doctors on the one hand,
and those involving bank tellers and hotel clerks on the other.", 1 7
The difference between these two groupings was the element of
professional and managerial responsibility, a focus that
significantly narrowed "the sweep of the commentary's
definition." 118
Yet not all courts agreed regarding the degree to which this
new standard limited the guideline. In some jurisdictions, clerks
and low-level employees, whose jobs the courts would have
previously considered "positions of trust," escaped the
enhancement. 119  But for defendants in higher positions,
inconsistencies remained. For instance, in United States v. West,
the president and sole employee of a courier company stole checks
and credit card information that businesses had contracted with
him to transport. 120 The majority of a panel of the D.C. Circuit
found West's role as a courier "involved almost no discretion
whatsoever - his job consisted of nothing more than transporting
certain items from one place to another."1 21 As such, it was not a
position of trust and any alternative interpretation "would stretch
the abuse-of-trust enhancement to cover endless numbers of jobs
involving absolutely no professional or managerial discretion, in
clear contravention of the plain language of the commentary to
supervision an employee receives"); United States v. Jankowski, 194 F.3d
878, 884 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that prior to the amendment in 1993, the
courts applied the enhancement "inconsistently"); United States v. West, 56
F.3d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The commentary to section 3B1.3, which was
significantly amended on November 1, 1993, provides substantial guidance as
to the meaning of a 'position of trust ..... "').
117. United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 1996); see also
West, 56 F.3d at 220 (looking at the commentary examples and stating that
"[elach of these examples contemplates a 'professional' or 'manager' who,
because of his or her special knowledge, expertise, or managerial authority, is
trusted to exercise 'substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily
given considerable deference"').
118. Ragland, 72 F.3d at 502.
119. See, e.g., Reccko, 151 F.3d at 32 (holding that while a police station
receptionist's job may have "afforded her access to information," the position
provided her with "no discernible discretion"); United States v. Ward, 222
F.3d 909, 912 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant, whose job it was
to guard an armored car, had "very little discretion" in the performance of his
duties).
120. 56 F.3d at 217.
121. Id.
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section 3B1.3."'122  In dissent, however, Judge Wald did not
describe the defendant as a courier with no discretion; as the
president of a company he received no supervision and made
discretionary decisions with every contract he decided to accept. 123
Far from having no discretion, Judge Wald believed West had
complete discretion.
In a similar analysis, the Eleventh Circuit struggled with
whether a position of trust could form outside of the traditional
employer/employee relationship. In United States v. Mullens the
court held that the president of a fraudulent investment firm that
functioned as a ponzi scheme was not in a position of trust. 124
Despite the government's argument that the defendant developed
personal trust relationships with many of the victims through his
country club membership, in addition to receiving the trust of
other investors via his control over their funds, the court
maintained that the defendant did not hold position of private
trust.125 "Fraudulently inducing trust in an investor," the court
explained, "is not the same as abusing a bona fide relationship of
trust with [an] investor."'126
Mullens, and a line of cases that followed, hinted at a new
standard that went beyond managerial discretion to require a
legitimate fiduciary relationship between the victim entrustor and
the defendant entrustee. 127 Some courts applied this theory to
distinguish the persistently troubling bank tellers from the
attorneys, executives, and physicians. Since the "ordinary
dictionary concept of reliance or confidence" would include a
bank's trust in its tellers, the Sixth Circuit felt that "as used in
the guideline, 'position of public or private trust' is a term of art,
appropriating some of the aspects of the legal concept of a trustee
122. Id. at 221.
123. Id. at 222.
124. 65 F.3d 1560, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995).
125. Id. at 1566-67.
126. Id. at 1567; see also United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir.
2002) (following Mullens to hold that the defendant's representation of
himself as both a lawyer and a trader did not place him in a position of trust
with respect to those who, knowing this status, chose to provide the
defendant with funds to invest).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 536 (4th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Caplinger, 339 F.3d 226, 236-38 (4th Cir. 2003).
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or fiduciary."'128 In other situations, courts used the fiduciary
theory only to analyze those cases that fell outside the typical
employee abuse of trust fact pattern. 129 In these cases, courts
tried to distinguish between fiduciary or personal trust
relationships and the "ostensibly normal arms-length commercial
relationship" in which "no trust relationship exists between the
two principals."'130 In one such case, the Second Circuit held that
a defendant who sought loans for a nonexistent company was not
in a position of trust.13 1 The defendant's victims were lenders, not
shareholders, and while "a corporation's management of course
owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders," borrower/lender
"relationships are typically at arm's length, and a firm's
obligations to creditors are generally regarded solely as
contractual."132
The discretion standard also highlighted a pre-existing
inconsistency in § 3B1.3's application across the circuits. Even
before the Commission's 1993 amendment, some courts focused on
an apparent requirement that the victim be the party that
entrusted the defendant, while other courts failed to mention this
constraint. 33 The new discretion standard, however, required a
128. United States v. Ragland, 72 F.3d 500, 502-03 (6th Cir. 1996).
129. United States v. Brunson, 54 F.3d 673, 677 (10th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that there are two types of cases in which § 3B1.3 apply: where
"the victim is a business and the defendant is an employee who has taken
advantage of the knowledge and responsibilities acquired by virtue of his or
her position within the company" and the "type of case where ... a fiduciary
or personal trust relationship exists").
130. Id. at 678.
131. United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1996).
132. Id. at 48.
133. Compare United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 n.3, 507 (9th Cir.
1990) (asserting that whether a defendant was in a position of trust must be
viewed from the perspective of the victim and going to great lengths to show
that the victim families placed their trust in Hill), and United States v.
Castagnet, 936 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1991) (arguing that despite the fact that
the defendant no longer worked for the victim when he committed the crime,
"the relationship that [previously] existed ... provided the ability to commit
the crime"), and United States v. Odoms, 801 F. Supp. 59, 61-62 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (distinguishing between a bank teller and a mail sorter because the
latter "cannot be observed by the members of the public who have entrusted
her with their mail"), with United States v. Lamb, 6. F.3d 415, 420 (7th Cir.
1993) (explaining that the Postal Service placed trust in the defendant but
the victims were the "individuals whose property (mail) he stole or
destroyed"), and United States v. Lange, 918 F.2d 707, 709-10 (8th Cir. 1990)
PLACING TRUST IN THE GUIDELINES
court to assess whether an employer/fiduciary provided the
defendant with discretionary power in order to decide whether the
defendant held a position of trust. This analysis, therefore,
invited courts to focus on whether the award of discretion came
from the victim. 134
For example, in United States v. Hathcoat, the Seventh
Circuit remanded a case in which a bank employee's manager
joined in her embezzlement scheme. 13 5  In this situation,
reminiscent of the Fourth Circuit's 'sloppy"' supervisors, 136 the
court felt that if "Ms. Hathcoat was subjected to the same scrutiny
as all other ordinary tellers but simply had, from her perspective,
the good fortune to have a supervisor who was as dishonest as she,
it would be difficult to conclude that her freedom of action had
been bestowed upon her by the bank." 137 The district court was
therefore instructed to assess whether the freedom that allowed
Hathcoat to commit the crime "was attributable to the actions of
the victim Bank or to the actions of her confederate-manager."', 38
In another fact-specific case, a contractor failed to disclose
certain details when signing a contract with NASA, in violation of
the Trust in Negotiations Act (TINA).139 The Second Circuit held
that despite his fraud, the defendant "did not occupy a position of
trust vis-A-vis the government" and therefore could not receive a §
(no mention of victim as entrustor), and United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467,
473 (10th Cir. 1993) (same).
134. In contrast, the access and authority standard only required that the
position confer "access and authority (not necessarily the right) to handle the
valuable things or to direct the disposition of such things." Odoms, 801 F.
Supp. at 63 (footnote omitted).
135. 30 F.3d 913, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).
136. See United States v. Helton, 953 F.2d 867, 870 (4th Cir. 1992); supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
137. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d at 919; see also United States v. Isaacson 155 F.3d
1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (stating that the
defendant's supervisors' failure to follow security procedures did not provide
"a shred of evidence that the bank endowed [the defendant's] position with
any special trust form of trust. Rather from its standpoint as the victim of
the offense, no significant trust was reposed in Isaacson"). But see id. at
1084-85 (majority opinion) (holding that the defendant held a special position
of trust as a "head vault teller," and as such "was not required to undergo all
of the security checks that the other tellers went through").
138. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d. at 920.
139. United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1995).
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3B1.3 enhancement. 140 The court pointed to the fact that "the
cases relied upon by the government indicate that the discretion
must be entrusted to the defendant by the victim," while in the
Guidelines "every example of an abuse of trust in the Commentary
accompanying Section 3B1.3 also involves a victim entrusting an
agent or employee with discretion."' 4 1  Similar arm's length
relationships prevented the defendant in United States v.
Garrison from receiving a § 3B1.3 enhancement. 142  In this
Medicare fraud case, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's application of the enhancement because the defendant
CEO of a nursing care corporation sent billing information
through a fiscal intermediary. 143 As such, the defendant and her
company were not "directly in a position of trust in relation to
[the] Medicare [program]," the ultimate victim of the scheme.144
Not all circuits, however, followed this new standard.
Notably, the Seventh Circuit case United States v. Davuluri,
focused on managerial discretion but refused to require a fiduciary
relationship. 145 Though the case was similar to Mullens, the
Davuluri court held that a commercial relationship that provides
the defendant with wide discretion to act on behalf of the victim
creates a position of trust, even if the parties formed the
relationship through an arm's length transaction. 4 6
140. Id. at 455.
141. Id. at 456. Secondarily, the court relied on the fact that Broderson's
underlying crime was a violation of the TINA. As such, the crime was not
independent of the abuse of trust and therefore the betrayal was already
included in the base offense level. See id.
142. See 133 F.3d 831, 838-39 (11th Cir. 1998).
143. Id. at 841.
144. Id. The court distinguished this situation from one in which a doctor
makes medical judgments because such judgments involve a tremendous
amount of discretion, forcing both the patient and the government to rely on
the doctor's honesty. Id. at 842.
145. 239 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2001).
146. Id. at 909. ("While the range of activities that may constitute a
position of trust under our prior precedents is not entirely pellucid, we have
frequently emphasized that a defendant who has wide discretion to act on
behalf of his victim satisfies the first prong of the enhancement test. ... To
the extent that Mullens holds that a financial advisor with total control over
investors' funds does not occupy a position of trust, we respectfully decline to
follow that decision as inconsistent with our own case law.") (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1305-06 (11th Cir.
2002) (Hull, J., dissenting) (asserting that a defendant entrusted with the
discretion to invest the funds of others should receive a § 3B1.3
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Other circuits merely paid lip service to the discretionary
standard or refused to abandon analyses that preceded the
Commission's amendment. For example, in United States v.
Hussey, the Second Circuit affirmed a two-level sentence
enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, asserting that the
defendants "created an impression in their principal victims that
they occupied a fiduciary-like relationship with them."'14 7 In order
to bolster the credibility of this mere "impression" of a
relationship, the court explained that the authority entrusted by
the victims also allowed the defendants "a great deal of freedom to
commit a difficult-to-detect wrong."'148 In a similar vein, the Ninth
Circuit refused to abandon the difficult-to-detect standard, 149
while the Fourth Circuit applied an entirely new four-factor test
that focused on:
(1) whether the defendant had either special duties or
'special access to information not available to other
employees'; (2) the extent of discretion the defendant
possesses; (3) whether the defendant's acts indicate that
he is 'more culpable' than others" who are in positions
similar to his and who engage in criminal acts; and (4)
viewing the entire question of abuse of trust from the
victim's perspective. 150
enhancement).
147. 254 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 2001).
148. Id. During the 1990s, courts struggled with a series of cases in which
defendants pretended to serve in positions of trust. The commission
eventually added amendment 580, applying the enhancement to situations
"in which the defendant provides sufficient indicia to the victim that the
defendant legitimately holds a position of private or public trust when, in
fact, the defendant does not." GUIDELINES § 3B1.3, cmt. n.2; see also
GUIDELINES app. C, amend. 580 (effective Nov. 1, 1998); United States v.
Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a defendant who
impersonated a doctor did not legitimately occupy a position of trust and so
could not receive a § 3B1.3 enhancement); United States v. Queen, 4 F.3d 925
(10th Cir. 1993) (applying § 3B1.3 to the president of a fraudulent investment
company).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Velez, 185 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (9th Cir.
1999).
150. United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing
United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also United
States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2000) (listing post-1994 cases
from the Fourth and Ninth Circuits that continued to hold that postal
window clerks occupied positions of trust); United States v. Oplinger, 150
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These examples demonstrate that standards still differ across
the circuits. Meanwhile, even within circuits, the existing
standards fail to eliminate subjectivity from the judicial
applications of the Guidelines. As Professor Lisa M. Fairfax has
pointed out, the current means of applying the enhancement are
far from ideal.' 51 The "difficult-to-detect" standard
overemphasizes supervision, while the access and authority
standard can be "over-inclusive because many people have similar
forms of access without ever forming a trust relationship."'152 The
discretion standard is also not without flaws. Like the difficult-to-
detect standard, it often relies too much on the conduct of the
victim, while failing to punish those who are trusted but who
receive little or no discretion.1 53  Fairfax's analysis, however,
concludes by inviting a comparison to fiduciary law. 154 In common
with § 3B1.3's "trust," she points out that commentators and
judges also do not agree on the definition of "fiduciary," causing
"much confusion and frustration."155  From this assessment,
Fairfax recommends that analyses of § 3B1.3 concede that "the
concept of trust cannot be precisely defined"; eliminate all
examples (including the bank teller exclusion); and "adopt a
general statement of purpose and a broad list of relevant
criteria."'156 Fairfax's list would be non-exhaustive and would
"include characteristics from all theories currently being
employed."157
This solution may make trust analysis more akin to the
application of fiduciary law in the civil context. But it would also
appear to invite greater confusion, frustration, and subjectivity. A
focus on the virtues of trust, examining why we value it and why
we deem those who betray it more culpable than other criminals,
would do more to clarify the line between defendants who should
receive the enhancement and defendants who should not.
F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the "difficult-to-detect" standard);
United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998) (same).
151. See Fairfax, supra note 48, at 1045-56.
152. Id. at 1046, 1050.
153. Id. at 1052-53.
154. Id. at 1054.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1054-55.
157. Id. at 1055.
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IV. TRUST THEORIES AND SECTION 3B 1.3
Based on the work of numerous scholars we know that much
of the value of trust comes from the manner in which it fosters
efficient relationships and reduces transactions costs. 158
Complementing this theory, the commentary's examples illustrate
positions that rely on positive forms of trust that allow our society
to function efficiently. While corrupt lawyers and bankers can
victimize others because of their positions, those positions also
provide potential victims with countless benefits. As Coleman and
Putnam show, trust is more efficient than constant supervision
and regulation; the latter not only have immediate costs, but also
lead to more distrust. 159 As a result, crimes that abuse trust are
more culpable than other indiscretions because they threaten the
foundation of many beneficial relationships. 160
Yet not one of the aforementioned analyses distinguish these
threatening abuses of trust from a different sort of betrayal that
may serve as a reminder of why we do not allow trust to go too far.
When "trust" manifests itself through poor supervision, bad
decisions, or blatant breaches of policy, it is arguably not genuine
trust - and it is certainly not a form of trust the law should
encourage. 16 1 In many of these situations the trusting party that
disregarded a policy or rule may bear part of the blame for
improperly trusting another party. As such, the justice system
should not condone this detrimental type of trust by classifying
those who receive it as holding "positions of trust" under the
Guidelines. Courts should only apply the stigma and enhanced
sentence of § 3B1.3 to defendants who are properly trusted.
Otherwise, courts risk diminishing the impact of the enhancement
by imposing it on those defendants who receive trust through
158. See supra Part II.A.
159. See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
160. See supra Part II.A.
161. The disregarded policies and regulations often aim to serve the same
purpose as trust: fostering relationships and, like Putnam's abundance of
lawyers, providing a basis for cooperation. In fact, where trust is lacking,
regulations can provide a new foundation for trust because without trust
parties are able to transact only by relying on regulations. See Kahan, supra
note 22, at 339. Scholars, however, debate the degree to which such
regulations provide "backstops" to trust rather than merely displacing it.
Compare Rose, supra note 25, with Kahan, supra note 22, and Ribstein,
supra note 37.
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mere ineptitude or accident - a form of trust for which the court
should not provide added protections.
To apply this "efficient trust" standard to the Guidelines, one
should look at how and why the defendant was entrusted. For
example, in United States v. Helton, the Fourth Circuit recognized
that a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
supervisor's '"inept"' failure to oversee the defendant did not make
Helton's job a position of trust. 162 In United States v. Isaacson,
however, the Ninth Circuit found that a Bank of America Branch
Manager's and Operations Officer's shared failure to follow bank
security procedures amounted to their placing trust in the
defendant teller. 163 Despite the fact that the bank fired both
supervisors for "not requiring Isaacson to follow all of the normal
security procedures," the court held that this breach of protocol
amounted to a form of trust.16 4  In response to the dissent's
argument that the corporate entity, rather than the defendant's
supervisors, served as her employer, the majority pointed out that
"institutions can act only through people. The Branch Manager
and Operations Officer defined the job Isaacson actually
performed and made that job a position of trust... *,165
Unfortunately, such an analysis misses the point. If some
crimes are more culpable because they involve an abuse of trust,
that initial trust must have value in order for society to deem its
abuse worthy of the enhancement. In the case of both Helton and
Isaacson, the entrustment was its own abuse - both defendants'
supervisors abused the trust placed in them by not following office
protocol. NIST and Bank of America chose to regulate certain
relationships and did not want employees relying on trust -
possibly because the investment in oversight outweighed the
potential benefits of "relax[ing] a little."166 As such, decisions to
ignore such policies should not elevate a position that an
organization has already decided is not a position of trust.
By focusing on the victim entrustor requirement, the Seventh
162. 953 F.2d 867, 870 (4th Cir. 1992).
163. 155 F.3d. 1083, 1083-85 (9th Cir. 1998). Holding that the defendant
was a "head vault teller," the court avoided problems with the bank teller
exception. Id. at 1086.
164. Id. at 1084-86.
165. Id. at 1086 n.3.
166. PUTNAM, supra note 26, at 135.
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Circuit came to a similar conclusion. In United States v. Hathcoat,
the Seventh Circuit remanded the case so the district court could
decide whether the defendant's employer bank or co-conspirator
supervisor had provided her with the freedom to commit the
crime. 167  But it could just as easily have recognized the
distinction between positive and accepted forms of trust (created
by those with the ability and authority to make entrustment
decisions) and negative forms of trust that are the result of sloth,
incompetence, or criminal motives.
In a similar manner, when the defendant in Foreman flashed
her badge to avoid questioning, the court should have asked
whether the form of trust that Foreman aimed to foster - DEA
agents allowing her to avoid suspicion due to her occupation -
would be beneficial. 168 The dissent argued that Foreman's act did
not meet the guideline's requirement because it had little impact
on her ability to commit the crime.1 69 The agents clearly did not
believe Foreman's position created enough trust for them to let
her board the plane and therefore did not actually provide her
with any trust to abuse. The distinction between the efficient
trust standard and the dissent's analysis would occur if the agents
had allowed Foreman to proceed to the plane based purely on her
police identification badge. In that case, one would need to ask
whether it is acceptable for DEA agents to give other law
enforcement officers a presumption of innocence. If the answer is
yes, Foreman's use of her badge serves as an abuse of trust that
the court should punish. However, if such actions are a poor
means of assessing suspicious passengers, then it is an inefficient
form of trust that should be discouraged and not protected
through sentence enhancements against those who abuse it. Such
an analysis is not only more in line with the role of trust in the
Guidelines (and in criminal law more generally); it also allows
courts to avoid the analytical acrobatics of trying to prove that the
victim placed trust in the defendant.
For example, in a welfare fraud case, the Fourth Circuit
reiterated the position "that whether a person holds a position of
167. 30 F.3d 913, 919-20 (7th Cir. 1994); see also supra notes 135-38 and
accompanying text.
168. See 926 F.2d 792, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1990).
169. Id. at 797-800.
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trust must be determined from the perspective of the victim" and
asserted that an enhancement was justified because "[t]he
'victims' are the American taxpayers, who must pay the added
costs that such fraud imposes."170 The court presumed the public
entrusted the defendant doctor, either directly by virtue of his
position, or indirectly through a government that trusted him to
receive welfare funds for his services to patients. 171 Such strained
logic, however, should be unnecessary. Numerous cases point out
that government welfare programs, particularly those related to
the medical profession, must trust their professional
participants. 172 This policy decision makes welfare distribution
possible and, as a result, those who abuse this trust present a
"threat to the integrity" of an important - and efficient -
relationship. ' 73
In United States v. Hill the court found that the defendant
held a position of trust because his job as a moving truck driver
provided him with "the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect
wrong."' 74 The Ninth Circuit's analysis, however, struggled to
show how the victim families placed their trust in the defendant
rather than his employer. "When Hill arrived at the families'
doorsteps, the families knew that Hill would be their exclusive
server," the court explained, attempting to identify the moment
when trust shifted from the moving company to the driver
himself. 175 Hill's employer, the families understood, "would not
and could not monitor Hill's whereabouts for the duration of the
trip."' 76 Yet, regardless of which party placed the trust, the
company decided that it would be most efficient to entrust its
drivers (possibly because monitoring would be too costly or
impossible). 177 As such, Hill was in a position of trust regardless
170. United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 1995).
171. See id.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041, 1064 (9th Cir.
1997) (upholding a § 3B1.3 enhancement for Medicare fraud because "the
government as insurer depends upon the honesty of the doctor and is easily
taken advantage of if the doctor is not honest"), amended on other grounds,
116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).
173. See GUIDELINES amend. 666 (effective Nov. 1, 2004).
174. 915 F.2d 502, 506-07 (9th Cir. 1990).
175. Id. at 507.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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of what the families purportedly "knew."17 8 It should not matter if
the victim placed the trust; what should matter is whether a
beneficial form of trust, properly placed, assisted the defendant in
committing the crime.
Other cases go to even greater lengths to argue victim
entrustment, especially when defendants definitively abused a
position of trust but may not have had any interaction with the
victim. Before Judge Zagel of the Northern District of Illinois
applied the new access and authority standard, he showed that
even under the Hill theory, a mail sorter could be distinguished
from a bank teller because the former "cannot be observed by the
members of the public who have entrusted her with their mail,
unlike the bank teller who faces the bank customers throughout
the day." 179 In a similar effort, a panel of the Fourth Circuit found
that homeowners entrusted a real estate company with their
financial information.18 0 But when an agent of that company used
the information to perpetuate fraud against banks, he could still
receive the enhancement. 18 1 While the banks may have been the
ultimate victims, the court simply felt that the "clients have been
victimized as well."18 2
The efficient trust standard would also prevent the
application of § 3B1.3 when there was no trust in the first place -
essentially situations in which employers or colleagues did not
"relax ... a little."183 For example, in several of the mail handler
cases the decisions conceded not only that supervisors could
observe mail handlers, but also that the government invested in
178. Id.
179. United States v. Odoms, 801 F. Supp. 59, 62 (N.D. Ill. 1992). But cf.
United States v. Ragland, 72 F.2d 500, 502 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that
neither the defendant's employer bank nor the bank's depositors entrusted
the defendant); United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 1992)
(ignoring the victim entrustment requirement, though arguing that
"[m]illions drop mail in mailboxes every day trusting that the postal service
will safely deliver it to the designated destination" while "[t]he Postal Service
places corresponding faith in those it hires to deliver the mail"). As already
mentioned, however, when Judge Zagel applied the access and authority
standard he chose to disregard the bank teller exception. See Odoms, 801 F.
Supp. at 63.
180. United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 204 (4th Cir. 1999).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See PUTNAM, supra note 26, at 135.
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"concealed surveillance areas" and "mirrors... in the work area to
facilitate observation."'184 While these employees may have been
trusted in a general sense, they were not trusted professionally.
The enhancement is not for "people who are trusted" but for those
in "positions" of trust and institutions must identify these
positions. In this case, contrary to the sentencing outcome,
policies indicate that the postal service did not place trust in these
mail handlers. 185
In this manner, the efficient trust standard avoids protecting
relationships defined by negative or exclusively personal trust and
only protects important and valued forms of trust. Like Fairfax's
recommendation, it allows courts to identify positions of trust via
numerous avenues. 18 6 But it applies a major limiting factor that
forces all of the theories to reach the same destination, compelling
courts to remember why we value trust in the first place.
V. CONCLUSION
In the post-Booker era, courts continue to struggle with the
aforementioned issues as they interpret the meaning of § 3B1.3.18 7
184. United States v. Cuff, 999 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993); cf. Odoms,
801 F. Supp. at 61 ("While the post office is equipped with one way mirrors
and viewing portals, the open area where the defendant works is filled with
employees."); United States v. Milligan, 958 F.2d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1992)
(clerks daily financial reports were audited, though "only once every four
months"). But see United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 417 (7th Cir. 1993)
(recapping a postal inspector's testimony "that time and cost constraints
prevent the Post Office from keeping a record of each and every piece of First
Class Mail that is assigned to an individual letter carrier for delivery on a
given day"); Ajiboye, 961 F.2d at 895 (explaining that a postal carrier, in
contrast to a bank teller, is "free from surveillance when delivering mail").
185. In some jurisdictions, the commentary's mail sorter clause has
overcome this error and eliminated some of the ambiguities caused by the
bank teller exception. In United States v. Jankowski, a case of armed
robbery, one of the defendants worked as a messenger for the victim armored
car company. 194 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1999). In applying the
enhancement, the district court found that the defendant's position was
"more like that of a postal employee ... than it is that of a bank teller who
only handles a small amount of cash." Id. at 884. For the same reason, the
Eighth Circuit reversed. "Under the commentary," the court explained, "the
enhancement for postal employees is an exception to the general definition ...
[and] was not meant to carve out a general exception for all those who abuse
positions that involve tasks similar to the delivery of mail." Id.
186. See notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
187. See United States v. Coumaris, No. 05-3115, slip op. at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 22, 2006) (holding that an IRS agent is a position of trust that the
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Meanwhile the Booker decision appears to have further
complicated the assessment process. As already mentioned,
because the decision allows sentences exceeding the maximum
authorized for the crime, if facts supporting such a sentence are
"admitted by the defendant" courts must also contend with the
question of whether the defendant's admission concedes that he
held a position of trust. 188
These constant struggles to define trust, and positions that
are endowed with it, invite the conclusion that sentencing would
be easier if the Commission had never deemed abuse of trust an
important factor. But the numerous crimes defined by betrayal
reveal that much of the criminal law is already pregnant with a
concern for trust.189 The work of numerous scholars also shows
how important trust is in the operation of a complex society. As
such, its abuse in order to carry out any crime should be
recognized and punished accordingly.
But while trust may be a characteristic worth distinguishing
for the purposes of proportional sentencing, § 3B1.3 must be
applied in a manner that recognizes why trust is important. In
deciphering a criminal's "position" and degree of "abuse," judges
must appraise the value of the underlying trust. Only when a
defendant abuses a form of trust that serves society in a positive
way (whether by allowing people to save money, make exchanges,
or simply "relax ... a little"1 90) and that society aims to encourage
(e.g., not a form inspired by .'slopp[iness]' 191) should the court
defendant "abused on multiple occasions using his special credibility with law
enforcement officials in an attempt to avoid detection and divert attention
from his criminal conduct.); United States v. Baldwin, 414 F.3d 791, 797-
99 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying a discretion standard analysis and analyzing the
circumstances from the perspective of the victim); United States v. Ebersole,
411 F.3d 517, 536 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying a fiduciary standard); United
States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661, 673-74 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (discussing
whether the defendant portrayed herself as someone holding a position of
trust).
188. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) ("Any fact (other
than prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.");
see also note 13 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part II.B.
190. PUTNAM, supra note 26, at 135.
191. See United States v. Helton, 953 F.2d 867, 870 (4th Cir. 1992).
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apply § 3B1.3 to a sentence. Clear betrayal, by a party
appropriately trusted, demands such an enhanced punishment.
